This paper addresses the problem of forecast evaluation in the context of a simple but realistic decision problem, and proposes a procedure, for the evaluation of forecasts based on their average realized value to the decision maker. It is shown that by concentrating on probability forecasts stronger theoretical results can be achieved than if just event forecasts were used. A possible generalisation is considered concerning the use of the correct, conditional predictive density function when forming forecasts.
Introduction
Suppose that one is considering making a forecast of the variable X t at time t ¡ 1, having available an information set, -t¡1 . It is usual to concentrate on the forecast of the mean of X t conditional on -t¡1 , or of some other function of X t such as another measure of location. With each forecast there will be linked a value or cost function, as making a forecast error will cause a cost to some decision maker, but the link between the forecasts and the decisions is usually left vague. In this paper, a speci…c forecast/decision problem, of a simple but realistic nature is considered, with a general cost or value function. Some earlier literature discussing evaluation of forecasts within a decision framework, is Murphy and Winkler (1987) , Ehrendorfer and Murphy (1988) , and Katz and Murphy (1990) . Optimum forecasts are considered both at any given moment of time and also by considering averaged realized values over time. A simple procedure for comparison of forecasts, based on the average realized value of the forecasts to the decision maker, is proposed. It is shown that there will exist a probabilistic forecast which is an optimum and which does not depend on the costs involved in the decision problem.
The Simple Model
Consider a situation in which there are two "states" of the world, which for ease will be called "bad" and "good". Examples would be "freezing" or not, "high winds" or not, and "high in ‡ation" or not. The de…nition of the states could be somewhat arbitrary, but it will be assumed that there is a stochastic process x t and a critical level,b, which together de…ne the "state determination" procedure: the bad state occurs if x t > b:
Thus, x t could be the average temperature over the last hour and b some speci…c temperature, such as -5 ± C. The bad state may then correspond to frozen, icy roads or to damaged agricultural crops.
A sequence of forecasts will be made on day t¡1 of the events to occur on day t. Let b ¼ t be the forecast that the bad event will occur on day t (the correct notation should be t b ¼ t¡1 or b ¼ t¡1;1 but b ¼ t is used for convenience). Thus the forecast of the good event is 1 ¡ b ¼ t . Note that these are not point forecasts or even an interval forecast but that the forecast of the whole distribution is given for all possible outcomes, in this very simple situation comprising of only two possibilities. (see below where more than two possibilities (states) are considered). Given the probability forecast, b ¼ t ; a decision maker will then decide whether to take action, by comparing the expected bene…t of taking the action with its cost. Let the values of the activities and the cost of taking action be as shown in the following matrix
where Y 11 is the value in the bad state if preventative action is taken, Y 21 is the value of the activity in the bad state when no preventative action is taken (clearly Y 11 > Y 21 ) and Y 12 , Y 22 are the values of the activities in the good state, irrespective whether action is taken or not, and C, the cost of taking the preventative action. In the previous example, if the bad event is an icy road, the action will be laying down grit which will have a cost C. If the forecast is wrong and the roads are not icy, so the good event actually occurs, there still will be a cost. From the perspective of someone accepting the forecasts then one can form the following expected values:
and so action is taken if the …rst of these exceeds the second, which gives the condition:
Under the simplifying assumption, which will be used here, that Y 12 = Y 22 this gives
In other words, preventative action will be taken if the forecast, or the perceived probability of a bad state, occurring (b ¼ t ) exceeds q, as de…ned by (1), which is the ratio of the cost of prevention, C, relative to the economic bene…t that results from taking preventative action, Y 11 ¡ Y 21 . q may be called the cost-bene…t ratio. It is clear that q > 0. In order not to rule out the possibility of preventative action being taken, we also assume that q < 1.
On any particular occasion, or date t, the realized value of the economic bene…t of the decision rule based on the probability forecast b ¼ t , which we shall denote by V t , will also depend on the actual outcome, that is whether a good or bad event occurs. This can be displayed in terms of indicator functions as follows: (where I(w) = 1 if w¸0, I(w) = 0 if w < 0)
which can be simpli…ed into (recall that Y 12 = Y 22 ).
where
Suppose that an information set -t¡1 is available at time t ¡ 1, then the following holds:
The optimum solution set of forecasts is given by all
Proof The proof is straightforward. Since A t does not depend on ¼ t in (3), only the second term is of concern. Taking conditional expectations throughout (3) gives
It is clear that the last term can be negative for some values of
Thus, all solutions in the optimum solution set give the same (conditional) expected value of V t , and in that sense are equal to each other. However, the supreme solution has an advantage over other solutions as it does not depend on the cost function, whereas the other optimum solutions depend on the cost/bene…t ratio q, and on a knowledge of the region in which ¼ t lies. It should be noted that the supreme solution provides the complete forecast distribution, conditional on a particular information set. If there are several users, with di¤erent values of q, they can all use the supreme forecasts, but this is not true for other solutions in the optimal set.
It may also be noted that if a forecaster is undecided between o¤ering an event forecast ("tomorrow will be bad") or probability event forecast ("probability that tomorrow is bad is 0.6"), where the former may be based on a rule such as "bad if b ¼ > d" for some d, then the Proposition 1 suggests that the event forecast will be sub-optimal unless both b ¼ t = ¼ t and d = q. Probabilistic event forecasts are more useful to customers than just event forecasts.
Comparisons of Forecasts
Apart from the additive and multiplicative terms A t and (Y 11 ¡ Y 21 ), both of which are positive and are the same for a forecast using the same cost function, the essential component of the value V t given by (3) can be written as
where z t = 1 if the "bad" event occurs (namely x t > b) and is 0 otherwise. We can imagine having a span of dates t = 1; :::; T for which z t is observed and also probability forecasts from two models giving b ¼
can be formed and the forecasts providing the largest value will be preferred. It is seen that only the term q from the cost function is relevant. The two forecasts could be combined in any relevant fashion, such as linearly
giving an average value v (c) (µ) and one could search over µ to obtain the maximum average value available from such combinations. Clearly, from its method of construction, the optimum average value will be no less than Max
T´, as one could select µ = 0 or 1. It is easy to compare the values achieved by a particular forecasting model with those from two very simple models, one very naive and the other in which perfect forecasts are achieved. The naive model simply sets b ¼ t = constant, say p, for every t and so ignores the contents of the information set. It is easily seen that if p¸q then the expected value of this forecast is Prob (z t = 1) ¡ q, which could be negative, and if p < q, the value is zero. A rather more interesting case assumes that the information set -t¡1 can eventually be expanded su¢ciently that x t , and thus z t , can be forecast virtually perfectly. Whether or not this is actually possible is debatable. The value becomes
which is necessarily positive. As q lies in the range (0, 1), I (z t ¡ q) will only be non-zero when z t = 1 and so
is the fraction of the times the "bad" event occurs in the sample. In the limit as T ! 1, assuming fx t g is a strictly stationary process then v opt T tends to (1 ¡ q) Prob (z t = 1), which sets an absolute upper bound to the expected value of forecasts, and presents the supreme optimum.
In practice, however, the supreme optimum (9), which is based on the perfect event forecast, b ¼ t = z t , is unlikely to be attainable.
A Particular Example
In the previous section it was pointed out that for each value of t there could be many optimal forecasts and that all forecasts would be compared by their average values over a period of time. In this section, using a very particular example, it is shown that there may be a unique optimum for the average value, which is the supreme forecast. For illustrative purposes suppose the values of x t which determine whether a bad event occurs are generated according to the following stationary AR(1) process:
x t = ½x t¡1 + ² t ; t = 1; 2; :::; T where e t are independently and identically distributed with the distribution function F ² (¢), ½ 2 (0; 1), and the 'bad' event occurs if x t > b. For this simple example,
Suppose now that instead of ¼ t a decision maker base his/her action on b ¼ t given by
where r is an 'estimate' of ½. Using (3) and (4) the average realized loss over the period t = 1; 2; :::; T arising from using the estimate r, instead of ½ is given by
In what follows for convenience we normalize L T (½; r) by setting Cq = Y 11 ¡ Y 21 = 1. Since x t is strictly stationary and ergodic, the limit of L T (½; r) as T ! 1 exists and is given by
where as before
, and to minimize L 1 (½; r) it is su¢cient to consider values of r that maximize
It is useful to note that
where expectations are taken with respect to the unconditional distribution of x t¡1 . Also from (11) we note that
where h x (x t ) stands for the unconditional density function of x t . Since x t is strictly stationary, E (v t ) is time-invariant and using (13) and (14) we have
It is now easily seen that
and the value of r, denoted by r ¤ , that solves the necessary condition @L 1 (½; r) =@r = 0 for the minimization of L 1 (½; r) is given by
which gives the unique solution r ¤ = ½. 1 Therefore, the optimum value of b ¼ t in the multi-shot decision problem is given by the supreme optimum solution of the one-shot decision problem discussed in the previous section.
The extent of the average loss when r is not equal to ½, can be computed by simulation. One possibility would be to use the form
, and ² j t is a draw from the distribution of ². Table 1A gives the values of L RT (½; r) for T = 1000, R = 100, q = 0:2, b = 1; ½ = 0:0; 0:1; :::; 0:9, r = 0:0; 0:1; :::; 0:9; 1:0, and ² j t » N (0; 1). To minimize 1 The second order derivative of V 1 (½; r) evaluated at r = r ¤ = ½ is given by
the e¤ect of the initialization of the x t process on the results, the …rst 100 draws of x t starting from x ¡100 = 0 were discarded. An alternative procedure would be to simulate L 1 (½; r) given by (12) directly. Since x t is strictly stationary we have
where expectations are now taken with respect to the unconditional distribution of x t . Under this procedure we have:
is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, and x j are drawn from the unconditional density function of x t , namely Table 1B gives the simulated values of L 1R (½; r) for R = 50; 000; and in comparison to the values in Table  1A may be viewed as e¤ectively using an in…nite T value and a much larger R. The two approaches give quantitatively similar results and should converge to the same limits as both R and T ! 1. It is clear that the average cost function is not symmetric in r about its true value ½ over-estimating ½ is less costly than under-estimating it, so long ½¸0:2. For example, in Table 1B , when ½ = 0:5 the cost of using r = 0:3 is almost twice that at r = 1:0. Table 1B, may be thought to be preferable as all values are positive and r = ½ gives the minimum cost, as suggested by the theory.
The Two-Action, Multi-State Problem
Now consider a more general case, with m states and let b ¼ it be the forecast probability that the ith state occurs at time t, so that
The bene…t/cost matrix will now take the form
It is assumed that the cost of taking action is always C, regardless of the state. One should expect that Y 1j¸Y2j for all j, so that for all, or most states, taking action is bene…cial. Let
and suppose that the states are ranked according to the size of¯. Thus, the largest¯will correspond to the "worst" state, second largest¯to the "next worst" state, and so forth, and with the smallest¯, which will be taken to be zero, corresponds to the "good" state. Any pair of states with identical¯'s will be considered as being collectively identical for our purposes and will be amalgamated, so that it will be assumed that all¯'s are di¤erent. Based on the forecasts, action will be taken if the value of the action ("yes") is greater than no action, which is given by
This can be written more simply in the vector notation as
It should be noted that the constraint (19) has associated with it the other constraints that¯i¸0, C¸0, b ¼ it¸0 and
For a given set of costs and probability forecasts, b ¼ it , equation (19), gives the "action rule" of whether action should be taken or not. Given this action rule, it is now possible to determine the properties of the best forecasts. Introducing some further notation, let z it = 1 if state i occurs at time t = 0 if not.
Therefore, if z it = 1, z jt = 0 j 6 = i and, for some information set -t¡1 available at time t ¡ 1 we have
so that ¼ it is the probability of state i occurring at time t conditional on the information set, -t¡1 . The realized economic value of the decision to act is then
where as before, I(¢) is the indicator function. Taking conditional expectations with respect to -t¡1 gives
The …rst term is not a function of b ¼ t . The second term is certainly positive if b ¼ t = ¼ t and this solution does not depend on the cost function, and so is the supreme optimum. However, any b ¼ t such that the pair of inequalities
are obeyed will provide the same optimum expected value E(V t j-t¡1 ), but these optima require some knowledge of ¼ t and also involve knowledge of the parameters of the cost function c and¯.
As an example, consider the three state case:
Bad Medium Good Values¯1¯2 0 ; with¯=¯2
The constraints are now¯1
The supreme forecast is always Figure 1) . At any given point of time, it is seen that there are many optimal forecasting possibilities that require a knowledge of the cost-bene…t ratios, C=¯1, and C=¯2, and of the location, if not the actual value of (¼ 1 ; ¼ 2 ), but there is only one supreme forecast that is transferable across agents as it is not dependent on the cost function.
Comparisons between forecasts can be made using the obvious generalizations of the procedure discussed in Section 3.
Some Extensions
Forecasts are often linked with decisions and forecast errors with costs. Here, in a simple example but for a situation that can arise in practice, the full implications of these relationships are explored. The importance of achieving the complete forecast distribution, that is the distribution of the relevant variable conditional on the available information set, is emphasized. Many of these results readily extend to a more general formulation of the problem.
Let X t be a stationary process with probability density function conditional on information set -t¡1 denoted by f (x j-t¡1 ), so that
This will be called the "true density function", and let b f (x j-t¡1 ) be some estimate or model of it, also based on -t¡1 which is not completely correct, which will be called the "estimated density function". A cost function 
is considered, where y t is the actual realization at time t and y ¤ t is a forecast of y t made at time t ¡ 1. To be "well behaved" it is easier to consider the equivalent form Á (e t ; y ¤ t )´Á (y t ; y (ii) Á (e; y ¤ ) is continuously di¤erentiable in e 2 (iii) Á (e; y ¤ ) is convex in e for all y ¤ , so that it is monotonically nondecreasing as e increases for e > 0 and is monotonically non-increasing as e increases for e < 0.
Considering the simple case where the cost function depends just on e, and so is given by Á(e), the above conditions put severe constraints on the analytical form of the function. In particular, the Taylor series expansion of Á(e) will have zero constant and linear terms.
An important example of an asymmetric cost function is a simple version of the LINEX function introduced in Varian (1975) and analyzed in a Bayesian context by Zellner (1986) :
This one parameter LINEX function has the interesting property that it reduces to the familiar quadratic loss function for ® = 0. A pictorial representation of this function for ® = 0:5 is given in Figure 2 . For this particular cost function under-predicting is more costly than over-predicting when ® > 0:
The reverse is true when ® < 0.
The Cost Function C(e) = (2/a^2)*(exp(a*e)-a*e-1) , for a =0. 
which is easily seen to be
where the expectations are taken with respect to the conditional true density function of y. In the case where this density in normal we have
where E (y t j-t¡1 ), and V (y t j-t¡1 )are the conditional mean and variance of y t . Notice that the higher the degree of asymmetry in the cost function ( as measured by the magnitude of ®), the larger will be the discrepancy between the optimal forecast and E (y t j-t¡1 ). The average realized value of the cost function, evaluated at the optimal forecast, is given by
which, interestingly enough, is independent of the degree of asymmetry of the underlying cost function.
In practice, y t may be g(x t ) for any well behaved function g(¢). The optimum forecast of g(x t ) will then be y ¤ t which minimizes
It is important to note that the forecast chosen must not in ‡uence the range of the integral. If the estimated density function is used, an alternative forecast is achieved, b y t , which minimizes
Clearly, as y ¤ t globally minimizes (24) and b y t minimizes something else, it follows that 4 E [Á (e t ; b y t ) ¡ Á (e t ; y
with the equality holding only if b y t = y ¤ t , which occurs only if b f (x j-t¡1 ) = f (x j-t¡1 ). We therefore have Proposition 2 The forecast of any function of x t , evaluated by any well behaved function, is optimum if the forecast is formed on the basis of the "true conditional density function" f (x j-t¡1 ) for a given information set -t¡1 . Clearly better forecasts may be achievable by using larger information sets.
One implication of this result is that it may pay forecasters to concentrate on models for the whole predictive distribution function, from which forecasts for any function, y t = g(x t ) and for any cost function, Á (e t ; y ¤ t ), can be derived using numerical optimization techniques applied to (24). One way to do this would be to estimate the predictive density function using models for quantiles ( as in Sin and Granger (1995) ) or possibly non-parametrically.
Conclusions
It is quite routine to evaluate forecasts by their mean squared errors. But in many circumstances forecasts are used as part of a decision problem where the underlying cost function is non-linear and asymmetric. The simple model discussed in Section 2 and its extension in Section 5 clearly illustrate the importance of a closer link between the decision and the forecast evaluation problems. The 2 £ 2 action-state formulation, used in the analysis of weather forecasting, has also important applications in economics. For example, over the past few years a number of Central Banks, including the Bank of England, have been setting the nominal interest rate in the light of their forecasts of the in ‡ation rate, thus increasing the interest rate if their prediction of the in ‡a-tion rate exceeds a politically determined threshold rate. The simple model and its extension are clearly applicable to this problem, and require deriving the predictive distribution function of the in ‡ation rate, rather a point forecast of it. These decision theoretic models also highlight the importance of a complete formulation of the bene…ts/costs associated with correct/incorrect forecasts. In the case of the in ‡ation problem, immediate cost (bene…t) of falsely (correctly) predicting in ‡ation to exceed its threshold value is excessively high interest rates (in ‡ation). In these contexts a satisfactory evaluation of in ‡ation forecasts can be achieved only after a careful formulation of the costs/bene…ts of the decision problem under consideration.
